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Wemodel a credit network characterized by credit relationships connecting (i) downstream
(D) and upstream (U) ﬁrms and (ii) ﬁrms and banks. The net worth of D ﬁrms is the driver
of ﬂuctuations. The production of D ﬁrms and of their suppliers (U ﬁrms) in fact, is
constrained by the availability of internal ﬁnance—proxied by net worth—to the D ﬁrms.
The structure of credit interlinkages changes over time due to an endogeneous process of
partner selection, which leads to the polarization of the network. At the aggregate level, the
distribution of growth rates exhibits negative skewness and excess kurtosis. When a shock
hits the macroeconomy or a signiﬁcant group of agents in the credit network a bankruptcy
avalanche can follow if agents’ leverage is critically high. In a nutshell we want to explore
the properties of a network-based ﬁnancial accelerator.
& 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
How do ﬁnancial factors affect business ﬂuctuations? The standard answer to this question in contemporary
macroeconomics goes under the heading of ﬁnancial accelerator, which essentially tells the following story: ‘‘To buy new
capital goods, ﬁrms rely on several sources of ﬁnancing. These include internal funds, such as retained earnings or capital
infusions from ﬁrm owners, and external funds, such as the proceeds from loans and the sales of stocks and bonds. The
amount of internal funds is related to the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow. In response to a slowdown in sales, cash ﬂow will likely decline,
reducing the amount of internal funds and therefore increasing the amount a ﬁrm needs to obtain from external ﬁnance.
But lenders will be less willing to loan funds to ﬁrms with smaller cash ﬂow, and the value of ﬁrms’ collateral is also likely
to have decreased, further reducing their ability to obtain loans. Hence ﬁrms might be forced to reduce their investment.
This reduction in turn will lead to lower output, lower cash ﬂow, and yet again lower investment leading to a further
deceleration in output. This theory provides a possible explanation for why changes in the amount of investment can have
a multiplier impact on the broader economy’’ (Economic Report of the President, 2005, p. 59).
Central to this story is information, not only about the conditions of the parties in a credit relationship but also about
the incentives that they face. The lender has to assess the risk involved in extending credit to the borrower, i.e. her ability
and willingness to fulﬁll debt obligations. But information is asymmetric so that such an assessment is at best incomplete.
In this context, a simple and easily available indirect sign of the borrower’ s creditworthiness is a measure of her ﬁnancial
soundness captured, for instance, by net worth.ll rights reserved.
o).
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et al. (1999), are based on the representative agent assumption. In the market for funds, for instance, a representative
borrower interacts with a representative lender. A change in the representative borrower’s net worth, therefore, is a
metaphor for a change in aggregate net worth. As a consequence the ﬁnancial accelerator works its way through the
macroeconomy by means of changes in a proxy of economy wide ﬁnancial robustness—aggregate net worth or cash ﬂow.
In the models—and generally also in the real world—this aggregate variable is pro-cyclical: for instance, in a recession, the
ﬁnancial accelerator effect ‘‘is roughly proportional to the size of the decline in GDP, since the change in cash ﬂow and the
value of collateral would be expected to be roughly proportional to the decline in output.’’ (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989,
1990; Bernanke et al., 1999).
By deﬁnition, this aggregate view of the ﬁnancial accelerator abstracts from the complex nexus of credit relationships
among heterogeneous borrowers and lenders that characterize modern ﬁnancially sophisticated economies. This shortcut
simpliﬁes the analysis to a great extent but is a serious drawback because the current literature ignores by construction at
least three fundamental features of the real world ampliﬁcation mechanism based on the effects of shocks on the network
of credit relationships.
First and foremost, in the aggregate view, by construction the shock which originates the ﬂuctuation is aggregate, i.e.
uniform across agents. But in the real world an idiosyncratic shock can well be the source of an epidemic diffusion of
ﬁnancial distress which usually translates into a contraction of real GDP. In other words, in a ﬁnancial network
idiosyncratic shocks usually do not cancel out in the aggregate, especially if they hit crucial nodes (hubs) of the network.
Second, the aggregate view does not capture the fact that the spreading of a ﬁnancial disease may proceed at different
speeds in different parts of the macroeconomy. For some agents, ﬁnancial robustness may be pro-cyclical—as predicted by
the aggregate view—while for other agents it is ﬁnancial fragility that may be pro-cyclical. In Minsky’s ﬁnancial instability
hypothesis, for instance, the ﬁnancial fragility of borrowers increases during ‘‘prosperous times’’ sowing the seeds of the
next ﬁnancial crisis and recession. When the economy is booming, in fact, ﬁrms in fact are eager to increase their debt
(relative to net worth) and banks are willing to accommodate their ﬁnancing needs because of the widespread
expectations of abundant proﬁts. More recently Adrian and Shin (2008) have brought attention to the pro-cyclicality of
leverage, i.e. the typical measure of ﬁnancial fragility, of some specialized lenders—especially investment banks. The
unwinding of positions during the crisis in an attempt at de-leveraging has been an important factor of ampliﬁcation of the
crisis itself.
Last but not least, in a credit network the ﬁnancial accelerator can lead to an avalanche of bankruptcies. Suppose, for
instance, that a ﬁrm goes bust. Both the suppliers and the banks which made business with the bankrupt ﬁrm will bear the
brunt of the default. The deterioration of the bank’s ﬁnancial condition due to the borrower’s bankruptcy may be absorbed
if the size of the loan is small and/or the bank’s net worth is high. If this is not the case, also the bank goes bankrupt. If the
bank survives, however, it will restrain credit supply and/or make credit conditions harsher—raising the interest rate on
loans across the board—for all its borrowers. Therefore, the default of one agent can bring about an avalanche of
bankruptcies. While the proximate cause of the bankruptcy of a certain ﬁrm in the middle of the avalanche is the interest
rate hike, the remote cause is the bankruptcy of a ﬁrm at the beginning of the avalanche that forced the banks to push
interest rates up. The interest rate hike leads to more bankruptcies and eventually to a bankruptcy chain: ‘‘the high rate of
bankruptcy is a cause of the high interest rate as much as a consequence of it’’ (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003, p. 145). An
avalanche of bankruptcies therefore is due to the positive feedback of the bankruptcy of a single agent on the net worth of
the ‘‘neighbours’’, linked to the bankrupt agent by credit links of one sort or another.
Bankruptcy cascades may be of different size depending not only on the magnitude of the shock but also on the
topology of the network. When the corporate and/or the banking sector are polarized, the vulnerability of the network to a
shock—i.e. systemic risk—increases because the default of a highly connected agent, albeit a relatively rare event, may
generate a non-negligible cascade of bankruptcies.
These are the crucial aspects of real world ﬁnancial accelerator which we want to investigate. Therefore we must focus
on the complex pattern of credit relationships, which is a natural research issue to be dealt with by means of network
analysis. It is straightforward, in fact, to think of agents as nodes and of debt contracts as links in a credit network. In a
nutshell we want to explore the properties of a network-based ﬁnancial accelerator.
There are inﬂuential examples of network analysis applied to credit networks.1 Allen and Gale (2001), for instance, put
forward a theory of ‘‘ﬁnancial contagion’’ in a network model of the interbank market. In this case, however, the networks
considered are very simple and easy to study because they consist of few nodes organized in canonical forms. A non-
negligible and growing literature has developed from these premises on the network of the interbank market
(Freixas et al., 2000; Furﬁne, 2003; Boss et al., 2004; Iori et al., 2006; Nier et al., 2007). A different but no less
important line of network research (Boissay, 2006; Battiston et al., 2007) focuses on the trade–credit relationships
within the corporate sector, i.e. among suppliers of intermediate goods and producers of ﬁnal goods along the
‘‘supply chain’’.1 Networks are the main subject of a rapidly growing literature which applies the conceptual and analytical tools already developed in sociology,
computer science and physics to economics and/or provides new notions and methods to be applied speciﬁcally to economic phenomena. Recent books
by Jackson (2008), Vega-Redondo (2007), and Goyal (2007) describe the frontier of research on economic networks.
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among ﬁrms along the supply chain. Building upon ideas expounded ﬁrst in Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003, Chapter 7), we
pursue a more general and ‘‘encompassing’’ line of research. We model a credit network consisting of households, ﬁrms
and banks. Agents are linked by inside credit (i.e. credit relationships connecting ﬁrms belonging to different layers of the
same industry—the corporate sector—or connecting banks on the interbank market) and outside credit (i.e. credit
relationships connecting agents belonging to different sectors, i.e. banks and ﬁrms).
Previous and preliminary attempts at building a model of these interactions can be found in Delli Gatti et al. (2006,
2009). In the present paper we specify a mechanism for the selection of partners/lenders on the part of borrowers which
governs the evolution of the network structure—essentially driven by ﬁnancial factors—and compare the properties of this
endogenously evolving network with those of a random matching mechanism in the working of a network-based ﬁnancial
accelerator. In general, we analyze the interplay between microeconomic shocks and macroeconomic dynamics, stressing
the relevance of ﬁnancial factor in amplifying the effects of a given distribution of idiosyncratic shocks. We also consider
that economic downturns may affect agents’ ﬁnancial conditions in the credit network, possibly generating a vicious circle
of ﬁnancial deleveraging and economic depression. All in all, we propose an extension of the ﬁnancial accelerator
framework focussing on the transmission of ﬁnancial distress (through the bankruptcy channel) among heterogeneous
agents whose ﬁnancial fragility (Minsky, 1982) may amplify business ﬂuctuations, depending on the complex
conﬁguration of credit interlinkages.
Jackson (2005) distinguishes between a random graph approach to network formation, borrowed from physics, and the
game theoretic approach speciﬁcally designed to deal with economic networks. The former is, in a sense, ‘‘mechanical’’:
network formation is purely stochastic or the product of an ad hoc algorithm. The latter focuses on ‘‘equilibrium’’ networks,
where links are formed as a consequence of cost–beneﬁt analysis on the part of self-interested agents.
The approach followed in the present paper is half-way between the two: the partner choice rule allocates links to
nodes as a consequence of the search for the lowest price (interest rate). In every period, an agent in search of a partner in a
transaction—a customer in search of a supplier, a ﬁrm in search of a bank—has a certain probability of switching to a new
partner depending on the difference between the minimum price (interest rate) in a randomly selected subset of agents
and that set by the previous partner. The number of links connecting the nodes changes over time so that the topology of
the network is also in a process of continuous evolution.
We study the properties of the model by means of simulations, which show that a business cycle at the macroeconomic
level can develop as a consequence of the complex interaction of the agents’ ﬁnancial conditions. In other words, statistical
regularities emerge as a self-organized process at the aggregate level. In particular, aggregate growth rates exhibit negative
skewness and excess kurtosis, stressing the relevance of negative extreme events in such a complex network. A comparison
with a random matching mechanism shows that the endogenous partner selection process leads to a right-skew degree
distribution of the credit network which has some inﬂuence on systemic risk due to the diffusion of ﬁnancial distress
across sectors.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we sketch the main assumption concerning the economy under scrutiny.
Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to the price/quantity decisions of agents, i.e. ﬁrms and banks, respectively. In Section 5 we
explain the mechanism governing the choice of the partner. In Section 6 we analyze the main determinants of proﬁts.
Section 7 is devoted to the relationship between proﬁts, net worth and bad debt. In Section 8 we discuss the simulation
results. Section 9 concludes.2. The environment
In this section we outline the general features of the credit network under scrutiny. Our economy is populated by
households (ﬁnal consumers and labour suppliers), ﬁrms and banks. The corporate sector consists of two layers of ﬁrms.
Downstream (D) ﬁrms—indexed by i=1,2,y,I—produce consumption goods, while upstream (U) ﬁrms—indexed by
j=1,2,y,J—supply intermediate inputs to D ﬁrms. Banks, indexed by z=1,2,y,Z,2 extend credit to ﬁrms in both layers. D
ﬁrms are pure borrowers: they borrow from U ﬁrms (trade credit) and from banks (bank loans). Banks are pure lenders:
they lend to D and U ﬁrms. U ﬁrms are borrowers and lenders at the same time: they borrow from banks and lend to D
ﬁrms.
Adopting a ﬁnancing hierarchy perspective, we assume that the scale of production of D ﬁrms is constrained only by
their net worth. Since U output is determined by the input requirements of D ﬁrms, the net worth of D ﬁrms turns out to be
the main driver of ﬂuctuations. Changes in the net worth of D ﬁrms, in fact, bring about changes in the same direction of U
production. An unexpected shock to a D ﬁrm affects the credit relationship between the ﬁrm and its supplier, on the one
hand, and between the ﬁrm and the bank on the other.
If the shock is large enough, the D ﬁrm may be unable to fulﬁll debt commitments and may go bankrupt. The
bankruptcy of a borrower would be irrelevant if, so to speak, the agent were an ‘‘island’’. In a networked economy,
however, bankruptcy will not be an isolated and therefore insigniﬁcant phenomenon. For instance, the bankruptcy of a D2 In order to keep the analysis simple, the number of ﬁrms and of banks is exogenous. Since in our framework agents can leave the market due to
bankruptcy, in order to preserve constancy of the number of agents we have to apply a one-to-one replacement procedure when an agent goes bankrupt.
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non-performing loans—affects the net worth of banks, which can also go bankrupt. If they manage to survive, they will
react to the deterioration of borrowers’ ﬁnancial conditions increasing the interest rate. Hence borrowers may incur
additional difﬁculties in servicing debt. It is indeed clear that a relatively small shock may be ampliﬁed by the network of
credit relationship, an effect which we label the network-based ﬁnancial accelerator.
Interdependence may assume different forms. For instance, the bankruptcy of a D ﬁrm may bring about the default of
the U ﬁrm with which it interacts along the supply chain. Moreover ‘‘bad debt’’—i.e. non-performing loans—affects the net
worth of banks, which can also go bankrupt. If they manage to survive, they will react to the deterioration of borrowers’
ﬁnancial conditions increasing the interest rate.
The endogenous evolution of credit interlinkages affects the extent of bankruptcies’ diffusion: the bankruptcy of a
highly connected agent increases the probability of bankruptcy diffusion across the network.
All in all, we consider four markets: consumption goods, intermediate inputs, labour and credit. ‘‘Quantities’’, i.e. the
amount of consumption and intermediate goods produced, labour employed and credit extended are not directly affected
by ‘‘prices’’. They depend, instead, as we have already pointed out above, on the ﬁnancial conditions of the agents involved.
Prices, however, play an essential role in (i) shaping the evolving topology of the network and (ii) determining the
degree of agents’ ﬁnancial vulnerability.
As to (i), in two of the markets considered, i.e. the markets for intermediate inputs and for bank loans, the mechanism of
partner selection implies that the price charged by a supplier to a customer—which incorporates the interest rate on
commercial paper—and the interest rate on bank loans affects the number of clients of each U ﬁrm and the number of loan
applications to each bank, respectively, and therefore impacts upon the evolution of network connectivity.
As to (ii), prices are important determinants of proﬁts, which in turn affect the accumulation of net worth and ﬁnancial
fragility. The ﬁnancial vulnerability of an agent therefore is affected by the dynamics of prices.
On the markets for consumption goods and on the labour market, ‘‘prices’’ are exogenously determined and play a less
relevant role. Following Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), we assume that on the market for consumption goods, prices are
governed by a random process. As to the labour market, we appeal to real rigidity of one sort or another so that we feel
entitled to take the real wage as given and constant. In these cases, for the sake of simplicity and clarity we have
admittedly adopted a very crude ‘‘theory’’ of prices. We will relax these assumptions and enrich the theory in further
extensions of the present model. Our conjecture, however, is that qualitatively the main results of the model—in particular
the output of simulations—will not be remarkably affected by this relaxation.
There are two goods, a consumption good and an intermediate good. D ﬁrms produce a perishable consumption good
using labour and intermediate goods. For simplicity and as a ﬁrst approximation to a more realistic setting, we assume that
ﬁrms sell all the output they produce at a stochastic price.
U ﬁrms produce the intermediate good ‘‘on demand’’ with a technology that requires only labour. Therefore U ﬁrms do
not hold inventories of intermediate goods. We are ruling out by construction the possibility of avalanches of output due to
the mismatch of demand and supply of intermediate goods along a supply chain a la Bak et al. (1993).
The ﬁnancial side of the economy is characterized by two lending relationships: (i) downstream and upstream ﬁrms
obtain credit from banks; (ii) downstream ﬁrms buy intermediate goods from upstream ﬁrms by means of a commercial
credit contract.
The structure of the network of expenditure, production and credit relationships evolves endogenously due to a
decentralized mechanism of interaction: in every period each D ﬁrm looks for the U ﬁrm with the lowest price of
intermediate goods; at the same time each ﬁrm searches for the bank with the lowest interest rate.3. Firms
The core assumption of the model is that the scale of activity of the ith D ﬁrm at time t—i.e. the level of production
Yit—is an increasing concave function of its ﬁnancial robustness, captured by net worth Ait:
Yit ¼fAbit ð1Þ
where f41, 0obo1 are parameters, uniform across D ﬁrms. The equation above represents the ﬁnancially constrained
output function.
One can think of Eq. (1) as the solution of an optimization problem on the part of the ﬁrm. According to Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1993) for instance the problem of the ﬁrm consists in maximizing expected proﬁts EðpiÞ net of bankruptcy costs Ci
weighted by the probability of bankruptcy Oi. From the deﬁnition of proﬁts follows that they are an increasing function of
output Yi given net worth Ai: pi ¼ pðYi;AiÞ. Bankruptcy costs are assumed to be increasing with the ﬁrm’s size: Ci=C(Yi).
Finally, from the deﬁnition of the probability of bankruptcy, it turns out that it is increasing with the scale of activity, given
net worth: Oi ¼OðYi;AiÞ. An increase of ﬁnancial fragility, in fact, captured by a reduction of net worth, brings about an
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Yi ¼ argmaxVðYi;AiÞ ¼ f ðAiÞ ð2Þ
with f u40. Eq. (1) can be considered an element in the set of functional forms consistent with (2).
The concavity of the ﬁnancially constrained output function (1) captures the idea that there are ‘‘decreasing returns’’ to
ﬁnancial robustness: the increase in output associated to a given increase of net worth is lower if the ﬁrm is already
ﬁnancially robust. Let us denote with fx(x) the derivative of the generic function f(x) w.r.t. x. The FOC of the ﬁrm’s problem
can be represented by VY(Yi;Ai) =0 so that
f u¼VYAðYi;AiÞ
VYY ðYi;AiÞ
Therefore, the slope of the ﬁnancially constrained output function is positive—i.e. f u40Fif the signs of the numerator
and of the denominator are different. The assumption implicitly made in the Greenwald–Stiglitz framework is that the
numerator is negative and the denominator is positive. In order to derive the sign of the ﬁrst order derivative of the
ﬁnancially constrained output function, therefore, one has to sign the second order derivatives of the objective function
w.r.t. its arguments, output and net worth. The returns to ﬁnancial robustness are captured by the second derivative of the
ﬁnancially constrained output function, i.e. by the sign of the following expression:




If the sign is negative, the return are decreasing (as assumed in the text) and vice versa. In order to evaluate the sign of
the second order derivative of the ﬁnancially constrained output function, therefore, one has to sign the third order
derivatives of the objective function VYAY and VYYY. We do not have speciﬁc priors concerning the sign of these derivatives.
However, f 00 may be negative in a number of cases in which the signs of the third derivatives can be different. If the
ﬁnancially constrained output function is the same for all D ﬁrms, by Jensen’s inequality an increase in the variance of
ﬁnancial conditions brings about a reduction of average (and therefore aggregate) output of D ﬁrms.
For simplicity we assume that the production function of each D ﬁrm is of the Leontief type: Yi ¼minðð1=ddÞNi,ð1=gÞQiÞ
where Ni is employment and Qi are intermediate inputs, dd40 and g40. Therefore, each D ﬁrm has the following labour
and intermediate goods requirement functions: Nit ¼ ddYit , Qit ¼ gYit . Taking into account (1), in the end, both the demand
for labour and the demand for intermediate goods of D ﬁrms are increasing and concave functions of their ﬁnancial
conditions: Nit ¼ ddfAbit , Qit ¼ gfA
b
it .
Final goods are sold at a stochastic price uit. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that uit is a random variable uniformly
distributed on the support (umin,umax), where 0rumino1 and umax=2umin. We can provide the following rationale for this
apparently restrictive assumption. Let the demand of the ith commodity in period t be dðuit ,ditþ1Þ where uit is the relative
price of the ith commodity and dit is a stochastic demand disturbance speciﬁc to the market in question. Let supply be sit.
By assumption sit is made up of the quantities produced by a ‘‘large number’’ of producers so that the contribution of each
ﬁrm to total supply is negligible. In equilibrium uit ¼ f ðdit ,sitÞ, i.e. the relative price is an increasing function of the demand
disturbance, given the predetermined supply. If demand is sufﬁciently elastic, changes in supply do not affect the relative
price signiﬁcantly so that the relative price is essentially an increasing function of random demand. A high realization of uit
can be thought of as a regime of high demand which drives up the relative price of the commodity in question. In a regime
of low demand, the realization of uit turns out to be low and may push the ﬁrm out of the market if it is ‘‘too low’’, i.e. if it
makes the net worth of the ﬁrm negative.
Upstream ﬁrms produce the intermediate good by means of a linear technology which employs only labour:
Qjt ¼ ð1=duÞNjt where du40. For simplicity, we assume an asymmetric structure of the D–U network: many D ﬁrms can be
linked to a single U ﬁrm but each D ﬁrm has only one supplier of intermediate goods.
In each period the supplier—say the jth ﬁrm—receives orders from a set of D customers which will be denoted by Fj.
Since each D ﬁrm looks for the U ﬁrm with the lowest price of intermediate goods, by construction the number of elements
of Fj depends on the price pjt that the upstream ﬁrm charges to its customers: the lower the price, the higher the number
of D customers of the jth supplier of intermediate goods.
The price the supplier is charging to the ith D ﬁrm is deﬁned as pjt
i =1+rjt
i where rjt
i is the interest rate on trade credit.
Therefore, in our framework, trade credit is mainly due to a transaction motive (Nilsen, 2002).
We assume that the level of rjt
i depends on the ﬁnancial condition of the lender (U ﬁrm) and of the borrower (D ﬁrm) as
follows:
rijt ¼ aAajt þaðlitÞa ð3Þ
where a40 and lit is the ith D ﬁrm’s leverage, i.e. the ratio of commercial credit extended to the ith D ﬁrm to its net worth.
In words, the interest rate on commercial paper charged to each and every D ﬁrm belonging to Fj is decreasing with the
ﬁnancial soundness of the U ﬁrm and increasing with the leverage of the D ﬁrm.
Eq. (3) is an instance of the reduced form of a more general model for the interest rate charged by the lender—it will be
adopted also later on, see the section on banks below—according to which the lender (i) will be eager to extend credit at
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risk premium to the borrower whose magnitude depends on the borrower’s ﬁnancial soundness.
Point (i) captures the incentive for the lender to slash the interest rate in order to increase her market share in
‘‘prosperous times’’—i.e. when the risk of default for the lender is low due to a high net worth—i.e. to adopt an aggressive
marketing strategy.3 We will see shortly, in fact, that partner selection both on the market for trade credit and on the
market for bank loans is endogenous in our framework and that borrowers tend to switch to lenders who extend credit at
better terms.
Point (ii) captures the idea that, in an asymmetric information context, the lender requires an external ﬁnance premium
to the borrower which depends of the latter’s net worth (see for instance the optimal debt contract in Bernanke and Gertler
(1989). Accordingly, the behaviour of U ﬁrms in extending credit to D ﬁrms is similar to that of banks as we will see shortly
(Mateut et al., 2006).4 The presence of an endogenous external ﬁnance premium in the interest rate on trade credit is one
of the channels of the transmission and ampliﬁcation of a shock through the credit network, i.e. of the network-based
ﬁnancial accelerator.
While the scale of production of D ﬁrms is ﬁnancially constrained—i.e. it is determined by their degree of ﬁnancial
robustness—the scale of production of U ﬁrms is demand constrained, i.e. it is determined by the demand of intermediate
goods on the part of D ﬁrms. Therefore, the ﬁnancial conditions of D ﬁrms are the driving force also for the production of U
ﬁrms. The more robust, on average, D ﬁrms, the higher their scale of activity and the demand for labour and intermediate
goods so that the higher will be, on average, the scale of activity of U ﬁrms. For instance, the demand of intermediate
goods—and therefore the scale of production—of the jth U ﬁrm will be Qjt ¼ g
P




it and the demand for






Firms face a ﬁnancing hierarchy in which internal ﬁnance ranks ﬁrst and bank loans second. Therefore, by assumption,
the ﬁnancing gap, i.e. the difference between the ﬁrm’s expenditures and internal ﬁnance, is ﬁlled by means of credit. For U
ﬁrms, the ﬁnancing gap is the difference between the wage bill and net worth. As to D ﬁrms, expenditures consist of wages
and the cost of intermediate goods. In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, however, we assume that also for D
ﬁrms the ﬁnancing gap is the difference between the wage bill and net worth. This means that the acquisition of
intermediate goods can be ﬁnanced by means of trade credit, not by bank loans.
Accordingly, the demand of credit is equal to Bxt=WxtAxt whereWxt=wNxt is the ﬁrm’s wage bill (x= i for D ﬁrms, j for U
ﬁrms). We assume that the real wage w is constant and uniform across ﬁrms. By assumption, moreover, labour is abundant
so that ﬁrms do not face any labour shortage at the pre-determined real wage.
Self-ﬁnanced ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms with a level of net worth sufﬁcient to ﬁnance the wage bill, do not demand credit. From the
expression above follows that the demand for credit of the ith D ﬁrm is
Bit ¼wNitAit ¼wddfAbitAit ð4Þ
so that a D ﬁrm is self-ﬁnanced if it has net worth AitZ A^  ðwddfÞ1=ð1bÞ.









it . The higher the net worth of D customers of the U
ﬁrm, the less likely it is that the U ﬁrm will be self-ﬁnanced.
For simplicity, we assume an asymmetric structure of the ﬁrms–banks network: many ﬁrms can be linked to a single
bank but each ﬁrm has only one supplier of loans. The set of customers of the zth bank will be denoted by Fz. We assume
that each bank has a certain degree of market power. Since each ﬁrm looks for the bank with the lowest interest rate, by
construction the number of elements of Fz depends on the interest rate the bank charges to its customers: the lower the
interest rate, the higher the number of ﬁrms applying for loans to the zth bank.
The zth bank adopts the following rule in setting the interest rate on loans to the xth borrower (x= i for D ﬁrms, j for U
ﬁrms):
rxzt ¼ aAazt þaðlxtÞa ð6Þ
where Azt is the net worth of the zth bank and lxt=Bxt/Axt is the leverage ratio of the xth ﬁrm.
Accordingly, the interest rate on bank loans is decreasing with the ﬁnancial soundness of the bank (proxied by the
bank’s net worth Azt) and increasing with the ﬁrms’ leverage ratio.3 In a sense, trade credit is an investment that, like expenditures in advertising, by trying to establish a long-term relationship between the lender
(seller) and the borrower (buyer), yields a long term return (Nadiri, 1969). ‘‘In particular trade credit extension can be used as a many-faceted marketing/
relationship management tool and/or as a means of signalling information to the market or to speciﬁc buyers about the ﬁrm, its product, its ﬁnancial
health, and its future prospects/commitments to the industry’’ (Summers and Wilson, 2003, p. 439).
4 A similar interpretation is that U ﬁrms charge to borrowers a risk premium due to costly state veriﬁcation as in Boissay (2006).
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it will be eager to extend credit at more favourable terms to increase her market share. Moreover, the interest rate charged
by the bank incorporates an external ﬁnance premium increasing with borrower’s leverage.
As in the case of U ﬁrms, ﬁnancially sound banks extend credit at more favourable conditions to attract new customers.
In an asymmetric information framework, this attitude depends on the quality of banks’ assets (in our case, this is proxied
by the level of net worth) which acts as a signal on the loan market and allows ﬁnancially sound banks to set interest rates
lower than those ﬁxed by low-capitalized ones.5 In other words, when banks have partial knowledge of loan quality and
the market for bank debt is imperfect (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000; Stein, 1998; Kishan and Opiela, 2000), it raises an
asymmetric information problem about banks’ assets and a lemon’s premium is paid to investors (Gambacorta, 2008).6 At
the same time, banks charge a risk (external ﬁnance) premium to ﬁrms depending on their leverage (Bernanke and Gertler,
1989), as in the case of U ﬁrms vs. D ﬁrms described above. The presence of an endogenous external ﬁnance premium in
the interest rate on bank loans is another channel of the network-based ﬁnancial accelerator.
Notice that the leverage ratio of the ith D ﬁrm is




i.e. it is decreasing with net worth. Therefore, in the end, the interest rate charged by the zth bank to the ith D ﬁrm will be
rizt ¼ aAazt þaðwddfAð1bÞit 1Þa ð8Þ
i.e. it will be a decreasing function of the net worth of the bank and of the ﬁrm.
The situation is different in the case of U ﬁrms. The leverage of the jth U ﬁrm is












it as shown above. The leverage of Uj ﬁrm therefore is decreasing with its own net worth but increasing
with the net worth of the downstream customers.
The interest rate charged by the zth bank to the jth U ﬁrm will be










i.e. it will be a decreasing function of the net worth of the bank and of the jth ﬁrm but an increasing function of the net
worth of the D customers. This may be counterintuitive but it is obvious in our context: the higher the net worth of D
customers, the higher their demand for intermediate goods, the higher the debt—and therefore the leverage ratio, other
things being equal—that U suppliers have to accept in order to ﬁnance the wage bill and production and the higher the
interest rate charged by the bank to the U-ﬁrm.5. Partner’s selection
Each borrower has to choose the lender to establish a credit relationship with: a D ﬁrm has to choose a U ﬁrm and a
bank; a U ﬁrm has to choose a bank.7
Initially, at time t=1, the credit network is random, i.e. the links among D and U ﬁrms, and among ﬁrms and banks, are
established at random. From t=2 on, in every period each borrower observes the interest rates of a randomly selected
number of potential lenders—say a fractionM of the total population of lenders. We assume that the borrower sticks to the
current lender if the previous partner’s interest rate, rold, is smaller or equal than the minimum interest rate set by the
observed potential new partners, rnew. If this is not the case, the probability ps of switching to a new lender is decreasing
(in a non-linear way) with the difference between rold and rnew. In symbols:
ps ¼ 1elðrnewroldÞ=ðrnewÞ if rneworold
0 otherwise
(5 In a sense, this is similar to the context described by Lucas and McDonald (1992) according to which, if banks’ assets are observable, banks may hold
T-bills to signal their quality, enabling them to issue risky debt at a lower interest rate.
6 In this setting, ‘‘small, low liquid, and low-capitalized banks pay a higher premium because the market perceives them to be more risky. Since these
banks are more exposed to asymmetric information problems they have less capacity to shield credit relationships in the case of a monetary tightening,
and they should cut their their supplied loans and raise the interest rate by a larger amount’’ (Gambacorta, 2008, p. 798). The effects of monetary policy
changes and the functioning of monetary transmission mechanisms in a credit-network economy would be an interesting topic to be analyzed in a future
extension of the present work.
7 The intermediate goods’ prices charged by U ﬁrms to D ﬁrms in fact depend exclusively on the interest rates charged on trade credit.
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the changing interest rate charged by the U ﬁrms or banks so that the topology of the network is also in a process of
continuous evolution. The total number of nodes, however, is constant.
This procedure to choose the partner is activated in every period—i.e. with the same frequency as that of price/quantity
decisions—but the partner is changed less frequently, i.e. only when one of the interest rates the borrower observes is
lower than the one charged by the current lender. By construction, therefore, the relationships between ﬁrms of different
industries and between ﬁrms and banks last longer than one period.
When a negative shock hits a node—for instance a ﬁrm goes bankrupt—the lenders of the bankrupt ﬁrm react by raising
the interest rate charged to all the other borrowers (see above, Eqs. (4) and (5)). According to the partner’s selection
mechanism, this interest rate hike may induce the latter to switch to lenders who offer more favourable conditions,
thereby attenuating the fallout of the shock. Hence the partner selection mechanism may mitigate the spreading and
ampliﬁcation of the ‘‘disease’’, i.e. it may slow down the ﬁnancial accelerator.
In the literature on networks, the choice of the partner is sometimes governed by preferential attachment (Barabasi and
Albert, 1999), which is based on the assumption that nodes characterized by a relatively high number of links (‘‘hubs’’)
attract more new partners than nodes with a small number of connections. As a consequence, the degree distribution of the
network is power law. Preferential attachment plays the role of a self-reinforcing mechanism: the higher the number of
links of a certain node today, the higher will be the number of new links attached to that node tomorrow.
We do not make this ad hoc assumption here but a similar outcome occurs in our model due to the matching
mechanism explained above. Lenders characterized by more robust ﬁnancial conditions, in fact, can charge lower prices
and therefore attract more new partners. As a consequence, their proﬁts go up and their ﬁnancial conditions improve,
making room for even lower prices in the future and attracting more new partners. In a sense the process of partner
selection operating in our model makes preferential attachment endogenous, through a mechanism similar to that
described in physics as the ﬁtness model (Bianconi and Barabasi, 2001). In general, we follow a ‘‘strategic link formation’’
approach (Jackson, 2008), which broadly derives from ‘‘evolutionary game theory’’ models (Vega-Redondo, 2007) and gives
rise to an endogenous evolution of the credit network.
6. Proﬁts
The proﬁt of the ith D ﬁrm is pit ¼ uitYitð1þriztÞBitð1þrijtÞQit where uit is the stochastic price, Yit is output, rzti is the
interest rate charged by Bz to Di, rjt
i is the interest rate charged by Uj to Di, and Qit is the amount of intermediate input that
Di has bought from Uj.
Recalling that Qit ¼ gYit , output is ﬁnancially constrained as shown in (1) and Bit is deﬁned as in (4) we can rewrite the
equation above as
pit ¼ ½uitð1þrijtÞgð1þriztÞwddfAbitþð1þriztÞAit ð11Þ
Since rzt
i and rjt
i are deﬁned as in (8) and (3), respectively, in the end Di’s proﬁt is a function of its own net worth and of
the net worth of the U ﬁrm and of the bank.
Other things being equal, an increase of Ait affects Di’s proﬁt for three reasons: it makes output increase (scale effect);
 it makes leverage decrease so that the interest rate charged by the bank decreases too (D leverage effect);
 it makes the ﬁnancing gap decrease. This effect is captured by the last term in the RHS of (11) (ﬁnancing gap effect).
The scale effect can be either positive (if the expression in brackets is positive, i.e. if the relative price is ‘‘sufﬁciently
high’’ or the interest rates are ‘‘sufﬁciently low’’) or negative (if the opposite holds true). The D leverage and the ﬁnancing
gap effects are unambiguously positive.
Di’s proﬁt is also affected by the ﬁnancial conditions of the U supplier and of the bank through the following
externalities: an increase of Ajt makes Di’s proﬁt increase because it makes the interest rate charged by the supplier go down
(U net worth effect); an increase of Azt makes Di’s proﬁt increase because it makes the interest rate charged by the bank go down (B net worth
effect).








it , and Bjt is deﬁned as in








The effects of net worth on proﬁt.
pi pj pz
Ai Scale e. (7) D scale (7)
D leverage e. (+) Scale e. (7) D leverage e. ()
D ﬁn.gap e. (+)
Aj U net worth e. (+) U net worth e. () U scale e. ()
U leverage e. (+) U leverage e. ()
U ﬁn.gap e. (+)
Az Bank’s net w.e. (+) Bank’s net w.e. (+) Bank’s net w.e. ()
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customers and the bank.
An increase of Ajt affects Uj’s proﬁt for three reasons: it makes Uj’s leverage decrease, so that the interest rate charged by the bank decreases too (U leverage effect);
 it makes the ﬁnancing gap decrease. This effect is captured by the last term in the RHS of (12) (ﬁnancing gap effect);
 it makes the price charged to D customers decrease (U net worth effect).
The U leverage and the ﬁnancing gap effects are positive while the U net worth effect is negative.
Uj’s proﬁt is also affected by the ﬁnancial conditions of D customers and of the bank through the following externalities: an increase of Azt makes Uj’s proﬁt increase because it makes the interest rate charged by the bank go down (B net worth
effect); an increase of the net worth of the D customers Pi2Fj Abit affects U output (scale effect).
The bank’s B net worth effect is positive while the scale effect can be either positive (if the expression in brackets is
positive, i.e. if the interest rate on trade credit is ‘‘sufﬁciently high’’ and/or the interest rate on bank loans is ‘‘sufﬁciently
low’’) or negative (if the opposite holds true).








where Iz and Jz are, respectively, the set of D and U ﬁrms interacting with bank z.















An increase of Azt affects Bz’s proﬁt for the simple reason that it makes the interest rate charged by the bank to both D
and U ﬁrms go down (B net worth effect).
Bz’s proﬁt is also affected by the ﬁnancial conditions of D and U borrowers through the following externalities: an increase of the net worth of D and U borrowers affects Bz’s proﬁt because it makes their leverage decrease so that the
interest rate charged by the bank to these borrowers, i.e. rzt
i and rzt
j go down (D leverage and U leverage effects); an increase of the net worth of U borrowers affects Bz’s proﬁt because it makes the volume of loans to U customers
decrease (U scale effect); an increase of Di’s net worth makes the volume of loans to U customers increase while the volume of loans to
D customers increases only if ðwddfbÞ1=ð1bÞ4Ait , i.e. if the ﬁrm is not self-ﬁnanced (D scale effect).
Table 1 summarizes the effects of net worth of each type of agent on the proﬁt of the same agent (on the main diagonal)
and on the proﬁts of the other agents (externalities, represented by off diagonal entries).
As will become clear in the following section, proﬁts are an important determinant of the ﬂow of new net worth: the
higher proﬁts today, the higher will be net worth tomorrow. Table 1 therefore provides a rich and complicated picture of
interactions among the ﬁnancial conditions of the agents involved (Di,Uj,Bz).
For instance, the ﬁrst column represents the impact of an increase of net worth of Di,Uj,Bz on Di’s proﬁts. There are
obvious self-reinforcing mechanisms at work. If the net worth of Di is growing, it is likely to grow bigger in the future due8 Of course Iz [ Jz ¼Fz .
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increase of Uj’s and Bz’s net worth, due to the U and B net worth effects.
There are, however, also self-stabilizing mechanisms, which work mainly through the banking system. An increase of
Uj’s and Di’s net worth, for instance, tends to depress the accumulation of the bank’s net worth due to the leverage effect
and the U scale effect. The co-existence of self-reinforcing and self-stabilizing mechanisms is the source of the oscillating
behaviour of aggregate time series generated by the simulations that we will review in Section 8.7. Bad debt and net worth
In our framework, the U ﬁrms and the banks are lenders while both types of ﬁrms can be borrowers (if they are not self-
ﬁnanced).
D ﬁrms therefore are pure borrowers. At the end of the period, the net worth of the ith D ﬁrm is deﬁned as follows:
Aitþ1 ¼ Aitþpit ð14Þ
i.e. proﬁts are the ﬂow of new net worth. The D ﬁrm goes bankrupt if Aitþ1r0, i.e. if it incurs a loss (negative proﬁt) and the
loss is big enough to deplete net worth:
pitrAit
The net worth of D ﬁrms is the ‘‘engine’’ of ﬂuctuations for the entire economy. In fact, by means of (1) Di’s net worth
determines Di’s output, which in turn generates the demand for intermediate goods produced by U ﬁrms. As a consequence
also the demand for labour of the D and U ﬁrms are determined by the net worth of D ﬁrms.
Substituting (11) into (14) we get
Aitþ1 ¼ Aitþ½uitð1þrijtÞgð1þriztÞwddfAbitþð1þriztÞAit ð15Þ
The net worth of the D ﬁrm in t+1 Ait+1 depends in a non-linear way on Ait but also on the net worth of the U
supplier—which determines rjt
i as deﬁned in (3)—and on the net worth of the bank, which enters into (8).
The net worth of the xth lender (x= j for U ﬁrms, z for banks) is deﬁned as follows:
Axtþ1 ¼ AxtþpxtBDxt
where BDxt is ‘‘bad debt’’. In fact, if a borrower cannot pay back the loan obtained from the lender and goes bankrupt, the
lender has a bad debt (non-performing loan), that is accounted for as a reduction of its net worth. The lender goes bankrupt
if Axtþ1r0, i.e. if
pxtþAxtrBDxt
In principle therefore, the lender can go bankrupt even proﬁts are still positive if non-performing loans are high enough
to wipe out net worth.







In the case of U ﬁrms, bad debt is BDjt ¼
P
i2FBj ð1þrjtÞgYit , i.e. the amount of trade credit not reimbursed (intermediate
goods not paid for) by bankrupt D customers, which are grouped for convenience in the set FBj . The net worth in t+1 Ajt+1
depends in a non-linear way on Ajt but also on the net worth of the D customers, which determines output of the U ﬁrm
and bad debt (the set of bankrupt ﬁrms is a subset of D customers of the U supplier)—and on the net worth of the bank,
which enters into (10).























ztÞBjt , i.e. non-performing loans of bankrupt D and
U ﬁrms, which are grouped for convenience in the set FBz . The net worth of the D and U borrowers co-determines the
evolution over time of Azt+1.
The bankruptcy of a borrower creates a negative externality because the bad debt recorded on the lender’s balance
sheet yields an increase of the interest rate charged to all the other borrowers. This is the starting point of the ﬁnancial
accelerator. If the surviving borrowers experience an increase of leverage due to the interest rate hike, the lender will react
by raising the interest rate even further (see Eqs. (4) and (5)). Financial fragility will spread to the neighbourhood and may
spill over to the entire economy. An avalanche of bankruptcies may ensue. This is, in a nutshell, the way in which the
network-based ﬁnancial accelerator ampliﬁes a shock.
Table 2
Parameter setting.
Financially constrained output of D ﬁrms f¼ 2;b¼ 0:9
Lower bound for stochastic prices umin=0.5
Labour requirement of D and U ﬁrms dd ¼ 0:5; du ¼ 1
Intermediate goods requirement of D ﬁrms g¼ 0:5
Interest rate setting a¼ 0:01
Real wage w=1
Partner choice l¼ 1
Number of potential partners M=10%









Fig. 1. Aggregate production.
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We explore the dynamic properties of the network economy modelled above by means of computer simulations. We
consider an economy consisting of I=500 D ﬁrms, J=250 U ﬁrms and Z=100 banks over a time span of T=1000 periods. The
net worth of each D and U ﬁrm and of each bank at the beginning of the time horizon is set to 1. Furthermore, we assume a
simple mechanism of entry-exit: bankrupt ﬁrms/banks are replaced with new entrants on the basis of a one-to-one
replacement.9
First we simulate the baseline version of the model using the parameter values reported in Table 2. We do not carry on a
validation exercise on empirical data because our framework does not allow for essential features of a real world economy
such as investment in capital goods, inventories, innovation and technological progress, realistic labour market and wage
dynamics, etc. We have simpliﬁed or neglected these features to focus on credit interactions and ﬁnancially constrained
ﬂuctuations. However, we chose a conﬁguration of parameters which yields in the simulated data some well known
empirical regularities such as the negative skewness and the leptokurtosis of the distribution of aggregate growth rates. In
Section 8.1 we compare the output of simulation of the baseline model when the choice of the partner is endogeneous with
the properties of the same model for a random matching mechanism. In Sections 8.2 and 8.3 we will perform some
robustness checks and a sensitivity analysis of simulation results.
Fig. 1 shows the time series of aggregate D production obtained by adding up the production of D ﬁrms. Aggregate U
production follows the same dynamic pattern since U suppliers produce intermediate goods for D production ‘‘on
demand’’. As expected, in a complex adaptive system ﬂuctuations are irregular. Amplitude and periodicity vary wildly from
sub-period to sub-period.
Starting from identical initial conditions ﬁrms become rapidly heterogeneous.10 Over time, a right-skew distribution of
ﬁrms’ size emerges (see Fig. 2). Once again this is not surprising since the economy we are considering is characterized by
heterogeneous interacting agents.9 Accordingly, the total number of agents in the economy is constant over time. New agents are endowed with an initial amount of net worth drawn
from a uniform distribution with mean 1 and ﬁnite variance. We assume the entrant is small relative to the size of the incumbent ﬁrms.
10 In each period, each D ﬁrm is hit by a price shock because the relative price is stochastic as explained in Section 2. Therefore the accumulation of
net worth on the part of each D ﬁrm rapidly takes different routes. The accumulation of net worth on the part of U ﬁrms and banks is determined as a
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Fig. 3. Degree distribution of the network.
D. Delli Gatti et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010) 1627–16501638In addition, the distribution of the number of links (connectivity) for each lender (U ﬁrm or bank) becomes asymmetric
over time due to the endogeneous mechanism of partner choice governing the interaction among borrowers and lenders. In
other words, the degree distribution of the credit network suggests that the number of customers of lenders in the right tail
of the distribution is higher than that generated by a normal distribution (see Fig. 3).
In general, ﬁnancially robust lenders can supply credit at better conditions and therefore increase their market share,
i.e. attract a higher number of links. Financially sound U ﬁrms (resp. banks) set lower prices (interest rates), attract more D
ﬁrms (borrowers), are more proﬁtable and further increase their ﬁnancial robustness. The opposite holds true for
ﬁnancially fragile lenders. Both the corporate and the banking sector therefore become polarized and the degree
distribution becomes asymmetric. In principle this polarization increases the vulnerability of the network to a shock—i.e.
systemic risk—because the default of a highly connected agent, albeit a relatively rare event, may generate an avalanche of
bankruptcies. The likelihood of this phenomenon depends on the structure of the network.
A typical story is the following. Suppose that Di belonging to Fj does not fulﬁll its debt obligations towards Uj and goes
bankrupt in t. Uj will record a non-performing loan equal to the value of the intermediate goods not paid for by Di so that its
net worth will go down next period. If Uj were already fragile and/or the loan extended to Di were big, Uj would go
bankrupt in t+1. If it survives the shock, the reduction in net worth will lead the bank to charge a higher interest rate rzt
j
due to the U leverage and U ﬁnancing gap effect. Therefore also Uj can go bankrupt in one of the following periods.
The deterioration of the bank’s ﬁnancial condition due to the borrowers’ bankruptcies may be absorbed if the size of the
loans is small enough and/or the bank’s net worth is high enough. If this is not the case, also the bank goes bankrupt.













Fig. 4. The time evolution of bad debt.


















Fig. 5. The time evolution of aggregate growth rate.
D. Delli Gatti et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010) 1627–1650 1639An avalanche of bankruptcies will follow due to the positive feedback of the bankruptcy of a single agent on the net worth
of the ‘‘neighbours’’, linked to the bankrupt agent by trade or credit links.11 The extent of bankruptcy avalanches depends
on the amount of bad debt (see Fig. 4). Bankruptcy avalanches amplify business ﬂuctuations: as a consequence, the
distribution of aggregate growth rates is far from Gaussian, being characterized by negative skewness and excessive
kurtosis (see Fig. 5).12
Simulation results highlight the interplay between microeconomic shocks and macroeconomic dynamics stressing the
relevance of ﬁnancial factors (Bruneau et al., 2008, provide an empirical analysis of these aspects): the ﬁnancial fragility of
agents affects the business cycle (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Lown and Morgan, 2006) which in turn inﬂuences agents’
ﬁnancial conditions (Allen and Saunders, 2004; Misina et al., 2006). In other words, a macroeconomic shock (or a given
distribution of idiosyncratic shocks) affects the ﬁnancial conditions of ﬁrms and banks; then, ﬁnancial fragility ampliﬁes
the effect of the initial shock (in our case, we refer to this phenomenon as the network-based ﬁnancial accelerator), giving
rise to ‘‘second round effects’’.13 In the following, we will analyze statistical results coming from simulations to assess their
robustness and to analyze the effects of parameters’ changes on model behaviour.11 For empirical evidence on this phenomenon see Fujiwara (2008) and Fujiwara et al. (2009).
12 See Fagiolo et al. (2008) for an empirical investigation of the distributional properties of aggregate output growth-rate time series.
13 Using Swedish data over the period 1994–2000, Carling et al. (2007) estimate a model which takes into account both ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics
and macroeconomic conditions: they ﬁnd out that the output gap, the yield curve and consumers’ expectations have signiﬁcant explanatory power for the
default risk of ﬁrms. Similar results are reached by Bruneau et al. (2008) using French data over the period 1990–2006: according to these authors the
agents’ bankruptcy rate (as an indicator of ﬁnancial conditions) has a signiﬁcant impact on the business cycle; at the same time, business cycle has a














Fig. 6. Degree distribution of the network: EPC vs. RM.
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norendogeneous partner choice (EPC);
 random matching (RM).In the RM case the interaction among agents is no longer due to the endogenous process described above; in each period,
instead, each agent interacts with another agent picked at random in the population of potential partners.
Fig. 6 shows the degree distributions of the evolving (EPC) and the random (RM) networks. When the EPC rule is at work
the degree distribution is right-skew while this is not the case if the network evolves according to a random matching.
In Table 3 we report some statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, median absolute deviation—denoted by the
acronym ‘‘mad’’—, skewness and kurtosis) characterizing the distribution of aggregate growth rates (GR), bad debt (BD),
ﬁrms size (FSD), network degree (NDD). Moreover we report the correlation of defaults across sectors and bankruptcy
probabilities. Since distributions are generally non-normal, we use robust statistics: in particular, we compute robust
measures of skewness (Groeneveld and Meeden, 1984) and kurtosis (Moors, 1988).14 For each statistics we report the
average value and the standard deviation (in parenthesis) across MC simulations.
In both scenarios the distribution of GR is left-skew and leptokurtotic. Also the median of aggregate bad debt (BD)—that
is the sum of the bad debt of upstream ﬁrms and banks—and BD skewness and kurtosis are quite similar in the two
settings.15 The high levels of skewness and kurtosis signal the presence of a right-skew distribution of BD with a relevant
role for ‘‘extreme values’’ in both scenarios. On the other hand, the volatility of BD, as measured by the median absolute
deviation, is higher in EPC than in RM.
In both scenarios the ﬁrm size distribution (FSD) is right-skew with high kurtosis and clearly different from the normal
distribution. Skewness and kurtosis of NDD are higher in the EPC case than in the RM one. In the end, the endogeneous
partner selection mechanism ‘‘makes a difference’’ (with respect to random matching) essentially in increasing the
volatility of bad debts and in shaping the credit network’s degree distribution.
We turn now to bankruptcy related statistics. In our setting, the default of one or more agents in a sector can propagate
to the rest of the economy through the deterioration of ﬁnancial conditions, increasing the likelihood of bankruptcy
avalanches. In order to investigate this issue, we compute the correlation between the number of bankruptcies in different
sectors and the default probability for different groups of agents.14 The robust measure of skewness is: SK ¼ ðmQ2Þ=EjytQ2j, where yt represents the data, m is the mean, and Q2 is the median. The SK statistic has
o value for Gaussian data; the lower bound is 1 and the upper bound is +1. The robust measure of kurtosis is: KR¼ ½ðE7E5ÞðE3E1Þ=ðE6E2Þ1:23,
ere Ei is the i-octile of the distribution and 1.23 is the value of KR for a normal distribution N(0,1). Accordingly, KR is equal to zero in the case of
ssian data.
15 In this case we do not report ‘‘traditional’’ measures, because of the relevant discrepancies, for example, between the mean and the median or the
dard deviation and the median absolute deviation. We report only robust statistics which are more accurate in describing highly asymmetric non-
mal distributions.
Table 3
Monte Carlo simulations: EPC vs. RM.
EPC RM
Mean(GR) 0.0010 (0.0000) 0.0010 (0.0000)
Median(GR) 0.0064 (0.0019) 0.0063 (0.0017)
Standard dev(GR) 0.0778 (0.0098) 0.0783 (0.0095)
Mad(GR) 0.0478 (0.0046) 0.0480 (0.0050)
Skewness(GR) 0.4540 (0.0936) 0.4522 (0.0864)
Robust skewness(GR) 0.0879 (0.0256) 0.0860 (0.0243)
Kurtosis(GR) 3.7056 (0.3928) 3.7451 (0.3602)
Robust kurtosis(GR) 1.3063 (0.0757) 1.3056 (0.0721)
Median(BD) 19.6307 (2.7042) 19.1947 (1.8256)
Mad(BD) 11.0082 (2.8201) 10.3755 (1.8527)
Robust skewness(BD) 0.9113 (0.0746) 0.9060 (0.0727)
Robust kurtosis(BD) 6.5039 (8.6971) 5.9367 (8.1410)
Robust skewness(FSD) 0.8245 (0.0697) 0.8106 (0.0775)
Robust kurtosis(FSD) 1.2215 (0.1145) 1.4211 (0.1386)
Robust skewness(NDD) 0.5986 (0.0556) 0.3087 (0.1462)
Robust kurtosis(NDD) 1.5908 (0.2357) 1.3944 (0.1395)
Defaults: corr(D,U) 0.3555 (0.0283) 0.3472 (0.0262)
Defaults: corr(D,B) 0.0821 (0.0363) 0.0632 (0.0315)
Defaults: corr(U,B) 0.3616 (0.0610) 0.3562 (0.0344)
Default probability 0.0458 (0.0000) 0.0452 (0.0000)
Default prob.: D 0.0664 (0.0000) 0.0665 (0.0000)
Default prob.: U 0.0195 (0.0000) 0.0183 (0.0000)
Default prob.: B 0.0081 (0.0019) 0.0061 (0.0000)
D. Delli Gatti et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010) 1627–1650 1641From Table 3 we infer that the correlation between bankruptcies in different sectors is positive as expected but not
uniform across sectors. The coefﬁcient of correlation between D and U defaults is 0.35 in both scenarios, while the
correlation between D and B defaults is a modest 0.06 (in RM) or 0.08 (in EPC): the bankruptcy of downstream ﬁrms is
highly correlated with the default of upstream ﬁrms but not signiﬁcantly correlated with the bankruptcy of banks. On the
contrary, the latter is highly correlated with the bankruptcy of upstream ﬁrms: the coefﬁcient of correlation between D and
U defaults is 0.36 in both cases. The defaults of one or more D ﬁrms yield a deterioration of the ﬁnancial conditions of U
ﬁrms, spreads bankruptcies among U ﬁrms and propagates through this channel to the banking sector.
The total default probability (e.g. the probability that an agent fails in a given period) is equal to 4.5% both in EPC and in
RM. The bankruptcy probability of D ﬁrms is also similar in the two setting (6.6%). The bankruptcy probability of U ﬁrms is
almost 2% in EPC and about 1.8% in RM. Furthermore, the bankruptcy probability of banks is 0.8% in EPC and 0.6% in RM:
the endogenous formation of the network produces a conﬁguration of productive and credit interlinkages that slightly
increases the average probability of bankruptcy among upstream ﬁrms and banks.8.2. Sensitivity analysis
Let us now investigate the sensitivity of simulation results to the change of parameter values. We focus on six
parameters: f, b, umin, a, l, and M.16 We run 10 simulations for each value of each parameter varying in a certain range,
leaving the other parameters unchanged, to analyze changes in macro-properties, the incidence of bad debt, defaults
correlation and bankruptcy probabilities.
The results are summarized in Figs. 7–12. For increasing values of the parameter under consideration, the six panels of
the ﬁgures display the following outputs: (1) the standard deviation of aggregate growth rates, that is std(GR); (2) the
skewness of aggregate growth rates, skew(GR); (3) the kurtosis of aggregate growth rates, kurt(GR); (4) the median of
aggregate bad debt, median(BD); (5) the default correlation between D and U ﬁrms, i.e. corr(D,U), and between U ﬁrms and
banks, that is corr(U,B); (6) the overall bankruptcy probability, PB, and the bankruptcy probability of banks, PBB.
Varying the parameter f: Let us consider discrete changes of the parameter f from 1.2 to 3. Fig. 7 shows that this when
this parameter goes up, the dispersion of growth rates increases while skewness becomes negative and bigger in absolute
value. The median value of aggregate bad debt increases markedly for values of f above 2, producing a remarkable increase
of the probability of banks’ defaults PBB (see the last panel) due to the large incidence of non-performing loans on banks’16 We leave the other parameters unchanged since the parameters of the ﬁrms’ input requirement functions, dd , du , and g, are related to technological
issues we do not analyze in this paper. For similar reasons, the wage is a parameter which does not change across agents and over time, due to the lack of
realistic assumptions about the functioning of the labour market.


































































Fig. 7. Sensitivity analysis, the parameter f.
D. Delli Gatti et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010) 1627–16501642balance sheets.17 The correlation of defaults between any pair of sectors increases with f. The explanation of these results
may be the fact that the leverage of both D and U ﬁrms is increasing with f (see Eqs. (7) and (9) above) so that an increase
of the latter leads to higher ﬁnancial fragility and systemic risk.
Varying the parameter b: Fig. 8 shows the effects of discrete changes of the parameter b from 0.5 to 0.95. Higher values
of b produce an increase of output volatility. Skewness and kurtosis of the GR distribution are non-monotonic functions of
b: skewness increases up to b¼ 0:6 and then decreases and becomes negative while kurtosis decreases up to b¼ 0:8 and
then increases.
Median bad debt increases up to b¼ 0:6 and then decreases. Also the aggregate probability of bankruptcy PB increases
slightly up to b¼ 0:8 and then decreases. The probability of bankruptcy of banks is unequivocally decreasing with b. Notice
that according to Eqs. (7) and (9) the leverage of both D and U ﬁrms is increasing with b (keeping net worth constant).
Both f and b affect the output–net worth relationship for D ﬁrms. The effects of changes in b, however, are quite
different from those produced by varying f. Although an increase of either parameter generates more volatility at the
aggregate level, the increase of f produces more bad debt and, consequently, an increase of defaults, due to the higher
incidence of non-performing loans on lenders’ balance sheets. Instead, an increase of b has non-monotonic effects on the
relevant statistics.
Varying the parameter a: The effects of varying the value of parameter a in the interval (0.005–0.025) are summarized in
Fig. 9. Higher values of this parameter reduce output volatility and increase kurtosis, while skewness oscillates but remains
negative. The median bad debt and the probability of banks’ failures PBB are clearly decreasing with a. This effect can be
traced back to the fact that a higher a, increasing the level of interest rates charged on bank loans, ceteris paribus, produces
higher proﬁts. The ﬁnancial condition of banks is also strengthened by the reduction of non-performing loans. On the other
hand the average default rate shows a slight increase.17 The same pattern can be detected for the probability of default of U ﬁrms, not reported in the ﬁgure.



























































Fig. 8. Sensitivity analysis, the parameter b.
D. Delli Gatti et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010) 1627–1650 1643Varying the parameter umin: Let us now analyze the effects of changes in the degree of uncertainty faced by D ﬁrms. We
consider discrete changes of the parameter umin from 0 to 1. An increase of umin yields a reduction of price volatility and
therefore uncertainty for D ﬁrms. Not surprisingly, the reduction of price volatility at the ﬁrm-level—i.e. the increase of
umin—yields a reduction of output volatility at the aggregate level, as shown in Fig. 10. There is a clear pattern also in the
relationship between umin and the skewness of GR: the latter is negative for low levels of umin and increases with umin
turning positive for values of umin larger than 0.5. Median debt and the probabilities of bankruptcy are also decreasing with
umin: for high enough levels of umin (greater than 0.5) there are no bad debts and no lenders’ defaults.
Varying the parameter l: We explore the effects of changing the parameter l for a very large region of the parameter
support.18 The main effects of an increase of l are an increase of the median bad debt, of the correlation between U ﬁrms’
and banks’ defaults, and an increase of the bankruptcy probability of banks. Fig. 11 shows that these effects are signiﬁcant
for quite ‘‘high’’ values of the parameter under consideration.19
Varying the parameter M: The effects of changing the fraction of potential partners M are summarized in Fig. 12. The
increase ofM is responsible for a slight increment of output volatility, bad debt and defaults’ correlation. In general, higher
values of M increase volatility because of a higher probability of changing the partner according to the endogenous
matching process.8.3. Shocks on the parameters
After having evaluated the effects on the properties of the model of changing one parameter at a time by discrete steps,
in this section we perform an experiment consisting of 300 simulations in which the values of the parameters are drawn
from a normal distribution with mean equal to the values of the parameters in the baseline model (see Table 2 above) and
5% standard deviation. We focus f, b and umin because these parameters have a major impact on the properties of the
model as shown in the previous subsection.2018 We consider the parameters’ values from l¼ 0:0001 to 100 000, according to a log10 scale.
19 For instance, a remarkable increase of bad debt or banks’ default probability is observable for l4100.
20 In the case of the parameter b we ﬁx at 0.99 the maximum value it can assume.

































































Fig. 9. Sensitivity analysis, the parameter a.
D. Delli Gatti et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010) 1627–16501644In Tables 4–6 we report the average across simulations of robust statistics on aggregate growth rates, bad debt, default
correlations and bankruptcy probabilities. In each table the statistics refer to simulations in which the parameter’s value is
‘‘high’’ (for example, f42) or ‘‘low’’ (for example, fr2); the last column (labelled all) reports the averages across all
simulations, which we use as a benchmark to evaluate the effects of parameters’ changes on model behaviour.
Shocks on the parameters: the role of f: According to the results of Section 8.2, the increase of the parameter f produces
an increase of systemic risk due to the increasing leverage of borrowers. An increase of f also produces a moderate
increase of the median growth rate, meaning that the economy may grow rapidly with favourable credit conditions and
rising level of leverage, at the cost of increasing ﬁnancial instability and systemic risk.
Shocks on the parameters: the role of b: An increase of the value of b brings about higher volatility, as measured by the
median absolute deviation, higher kurtosis and (negative) skewness. This increase in volatility is associated with a
moderate increase of the median growth rate. Then, the parameter b has an inﬂuence similar to that of f on aggregate
growth rates.
Instead, the effects on bad debt of increasing b are quite different from those caused by increasing f. Values of b larger
than 0.9 are associated with a lower value of the median, median absolute deviation, skewness (in absolute term), and
kurtosis of bad debt than in the average case where all parameters are changing. This effect on bad debt also explains the
results on default correlation and bankruptcy probabilities: when the incidence of non-performing loans on lenders’
balance sheets is modest, the bankruptcy rate falls and the default correlation across sectors decreases.2121 Let us consider Eq. (1), that is the ﬁnancially constrained production function: given a certain value of f and b, D ﬁrms’ production will increase
lesser than proportionally to the net worth A. For ‘‘low’’ levels of b, only ‘‘small’’ ﬁrms (in terms of net worth) need credit to ﬁnance production, while the
fraction of indebted ﬁrms rises for increasing values of b. For example, if f¼ 2 and b¼ 0:75, a D ﬁrm with a net worth equal to 100 would produce little
more than 63; instead, if b¼ 0:95 it would produce almost 159, requiring additional ﬁnance. Furthermore, when the value of b is ‘‘very small’’ the ‘‘low’’
level of activity does not allow them to accumulate net worth and improve ﬁnancial soundness. This aspect is particularly relevant for those agents that
needs credit to produce, that is ‘‘small’’ ﬁrms. All in all, a ‘‘small’’ value of b is harmful for our credit network economy because of ‘‘very low’’ growth rates




































































Fig. 10. Sensitivity analysis, the parameter umin.
D. Delli Gatti et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010) 1627–1650 1645Shocks on the parameters: the role of umin: The effect of umin on aggregate growth rates is similar to that of f and b: ‘‘high’’
levels of price volatility for D ﬁrms, that is ‘‘low’’ values of the parameter umin, are associated with high levels of volatility,
(negative) skewness, and kurtosis. In addition, the increase of volatility (that is, the decrease of umin) is also associated to a
slight increase of the median of growth rates. Even in this case, the economy can grow more at the cost of higher systemic
risk and instability. In general, the effects of diminishing umin are similar to those generated by increasing f. It is worth
noticing that for ‘‘high’’ levels of umin there is a remarkable decrease of failures, due to the modest incidence of
idiosyncratic shocks on D ﬁrms which lower the likelihood of bankruptcy chains.
Shocks on the parameters: joint effects: Let us now analyze the effects of various conﬁgurations of parameters’ values. The
results of this investigation are summarized in Tables 7 and 8. The ﬁrst one reports relevant statistics related to simulations
in which the value of f is smaller or equal to 2, while Table 8 reports results when f is larger than 2. In both tables the
values of the other two parameters can be either ‘‘high’’ or ‘‘low’’. All in all, we have 23 combinations of parameters’ values,
considering that we compare the averages across simulations for various combinations of ‘‘high’’ or ‘‘low’’ levels of f, b,
and umin.
If we order the various scenarios according to the median of growth rates we observe the lowest values when br0:9
and umin40:5, independently of the value of f (which has a moderate inﬂuence also on other statistics for this range of
values of b and umin). The median of growth rates is quite ‘‘low’’ also with uminr0:5 when br0:9. Hence b has an
important role in inﬂuencing the level of the median of growth rates. As said above, higher values of b lead to more
production and net worth accumulation which in turn result in higher growth associated with rate of bankruptcies which
is ‘‘not-too-high’’.
There is an important interaction between b and umin: ‘‘high’’ levels of b do not cause large bankruptcy chains especially
when the volatility of the stochastic prices is ‘‘low’’. It is worth noting that an increase of price volatility mitigates
the ‘‘positive’’ effects of b described above, causing a rise of bad debt and defaults, but also an increase of the median of
growth rates.
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Fig. 11. Sensitivity analysis, the parameter l.
D. Delli Gatti et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010) 1627–16501646To sum up, an increase of f or a decrease of umin produces a higher median of growth rates but also more volatility,
more bad debt, and an increase of bankruptcy rates and default correlation. Higher values of b generate higher growth
rates, without causing large bankruptcy chains for modest values of f and of price volatility. For a given, ‘‘high’’ value of b,
an increase of f and a decrease of umin further improve economic performance at the cost of increasing ﬁnancial instability
and systemic risk.
9. Concluding remarks
We have explored the emergence of a network-based ﬁnancial accelerator in a credit network characterized by inside
credit (i.e. credit relationships connecting agents belonging to different groups of the same sector, i.e. D ﬁrms and U ﬁrms)
and outside credit (i.e. credit relationships connecting agents belonging to different sectors, i.e. ﬁrms and banks). D ﬁrms
are pure borrowers: they borrow from U ﬁrms (trade credit) and from banks (bank loans). Banks are pure lenders: they
lend to D and U ﬁrms. U ﬁrms are borrowers and lenders at the same time: they borrow from banks and lend to D ﬁrms.
Since D output is constrained only by the availability of funds, in the end, the supply of consumption goods is increasing
with D net worth. The net worth of D ﬁrms turns out to be the driver of growth and ﬂuctuations. U production, in fact, is
determined by demand of intermediate inputs on the part of D ﬁrms. Changes in the D net worth, therefore, yield changes
in the same direction of U production.
The bankruptcy of a borrower—e.g. a D ﬁrm—affects the lender’s balance sheet, which will record a non-performing
loan. The response of the lender to bad debt will be an increase of the interest rate charged to all the other borrowers.
Some of the borrowers will switch to lenders who extend credit at more favourable conditions—the partner’s selection
mechanism is in fact based on the comparison of the interest rates charged by the original lender and by her
competitors—some others will stick to the original lender.
Most likely, the surviving borrowers (who have not changed partner) will experience an increase of leverage due to the
interest rate hike. The borrower’s net worth, in fact, is a proxy of creditworthiness. Hence the ‘‘price’’ of credit—i.e. the

































































Fig. 12. Sensitivity analysis, the parameter M.
Table 4
Shocks on the parameters: the role of f.
fr2 f42 All
Median(GR) 0.0067 0.0083 0.0075
Mad(GR) 0.0467 0.0507 0.0486
Rob. skewness(GR) 0.0822 0.0939 0.0880
Rob. kurtosis(GR) 1.2962 1.3010 1.2986
Median(BD) 45.5683 103.7159 74.4483
Mad(BD) 26.5716 66.3031 46.3049
Rob. skewness(BD) 0.6906 0.7479 0.7191
Rob. kurtosis(BD) 2.2763 2.8078 2.5403
Defaults: corr(D,U) 0.3180 0.3896 0.3547
Defaults: corr(D,B) 0.1573 0.2089 0.1840
Defaults: corr(U,B) 0.4635 0.5155 0.4905
Default prob.. 0.0441 0.0542 0.0491
Default prob.: D 0.0602 0.0688 0.0645
Default prob.: U 0.0210 0.0320 0.0265
Default prob.: B 0.0212 0.0362 0.0287
D. Delli Gatti et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010) 1627–1650 1647interest rate—is decreasing with the borrowers’ net worth. The higher the leverage of the borrower, the higher the interest
rate charged by the lender.
The lender will react to the increase of the borrowers’ leverage by raising the interest rate even further. Financial
fragility will spread to the neighbourhood and possibly to the economy overall. Some borrowers already on the verge of
Table 5
Shocks on the parameters: the role of b.
br0:9 b40:9 All
Median(GR) 0.0041 0.0115 0.0075
Mad(GR) 0.0347 0.0652 0.0486
Rob. skewness(GR) 0.0644 0.1161 0.0880
Rob. kurtosis(GR) 1.2576 1.3473 1.2986
Median(BD) 109.9091 32.2576 74.4483
Mad(BD) 71.7013 16.0888 46.3049
Rob. skewness(BD) 0.7262 0.7106 0.7191
Rob. kurtosis(BD) 2.4702 2.6237 2.5403
Defaults: corr(D,U) 0.4023 0.2861 0.3547
Defaults: corr(D,B) 0.2241 0.1239 0.1840
Defaults: corr(U,B) 0.4795 0.5070 0.4905
Default prob. 0.0559 0.0409 0.0491
Default prob.: D 0.0710 0.0566 0.0645
Default prob.: U 0.0333 0.0185 0.0265
Default prob.: B 0.0371 0.0186 0.0287
Table 6
Shocks on the parameters: the role of umin.
umin40:5 uminr0:5 All
Median(GR) 0.0062 0.0090 0.0075
Mad(GR) 0.0447 0.0530 0.0486
Rob. skewness(GR) 0.0777 0.0995 0.0880
Rob. kurtosis(GR) 1.2915 1.3064 1.2986
Median(BD) 11.3436 144.6633 74.4483
Mad(BD) 5.7778 91.3985 46.3049
Rob. skewness(BD) 0.6260 0.8226 0.7191
Rob. kurtosis(BD) 1.9598 3.1862 2.5403
Defaults: corr(D,U) 0.2223 0.4750 0.3547
Defaults: corr(D,B) 0.0872 0.2646 0.1840
Defaults: corr(U,B) 0.3569 0.6015 0.4905
Default prob. 0.0328 0.0672 0.0491
Default prob.: D 0.0503 0.0802 0.0645
Default prob.: U 0.0086 0.0464 0.0265
Default prob.: B 0.0056 0.0543 0.0287
Table 7
Shocks on the parameters, joint effects: fr2.
br0:9 br0:9 b40:9 b40:9
umin40:5 uminr0:5 umin40:5 uminr0:5
Median(GR) 0.0031 0.0048 0.0090 0.0119
Mad(GR) 0.0305 0.0368 0.0603 0.0679
Rob. skew.(GR) 0.0525 0.0728 0.1039 0.1130
Rob. kurt.(GR) 1.2383 1.2728 1.3508 1.3474
Median(BD) 12.1965 114.0951 0.7572 56.4915
Mad(BD) 5.7766 70.0601 0.2359 30.2394
Rob. skew.(BD) 0.6494 0.7860 0.4882 0.8767
Rob. kurt.(BD) 1.8889 2.8949 1.3222 3.2070
Defaults: corr(D,U) 0.2485 0.4868 0.0463 0.3675
Defaults: corr(D,B) 0.1027 0.2829 0.0096 0.1345
Defaults: corr(U,B) 0.2631 0.6110 0.5270 0.4895
Default prob. 0.0365 0.0655 0.0215 0.0539
Default prob.: D 0.0558 0.0790 0.0364 0.0704
Default prob.: U 0.0103 0.0445 0.0004 0.0304
Default prob.: B 0.0057 0.0507 0.0001 0.0298
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Table 8
Shocks on the parameters, joint effects: f42.
br0:9 br0:9 b40:9 b40:9
umin40:5 uminr0:5 umin40:5 uminr0:5
Median(GR) 0.0031 0.0059 0.0105 0.0148
Mad(GR) 0.0307 0.0420 0.0622 0.0713
Rob. skew.(GR) 0.0504 0.0848 0.1127 0.1351
Rob. kurt.(GR) 1.2554 1.2661 1.2661 1.3545
Median(BD) 25.6849 314.7990 4.8486 73.6708
Mad(BD) 13.8436 216.0295 2.2890 35.3167
Rob. skew.(BD) 0.7141 0.7648 0.6390 0.8817
Rob. kurt.(BD) 2.5871 2.5610 1.9871 4.1711
Defaults: corr(D,U) 0.3339 0.5573 0.1464 0.4635
Defaults: corr(D,B) 0.1521 0.3630 0.0080 0.2468
Defaults: corr(U,B) 0.3688 0.6785 0.3763 0.6019
Default prob. 0.0427 0.0830 0.0283 0.0637
Default prob.: D 0.0610 0.0914 0.0457 0.0779
Default prob.: U 0.0179 0.0650 0.0042 0.0423
Default prob.: B 0.0135 0.0855 0.0021 0.0458
D. Delli Gatti et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010) 1627–1650 1649bankruptcy may reach a tipping point and default. An avalanche of bankruptcies may ensue. This is, in a nutshell, the way
in which the network-based ﬁnancial accelerator ampliﬁes a shock.
The output of simulations shows that a business cycle at the macroeconomic level can develop as a consequence of the
complex interactions of the ﬁnancial conditions of the agents involved. The network structure changes over time due to an
endogenous mechanism of partner selection, which implies that changes of the interest rate on trade credit and on bank
loans affect the number of clients of each U ﬁrm and each bank. The endogeneous mechanism of partner selection affects
essentially the skewness and the kurtosis of the credit network’s degree distribution, increasing the likelihood of
bankruptcy chains involving large ﬁrms or banks.
From the exploration of the parameter space we can infer that the credit network economy we have modelled can
exhibit higher growth rates by extending more credit to ﬁnance increasing levels of production. The consequent rise of
agents’ leverage, the extent of which depends on the parameters’ conﬁguration, may cause an increase of systemic risk,
that is a higher likelihood of bankruptcy episodes potentially leading to the deterioration of the system’s ﬁnancial
conditions.
This is a step in a complex and difﬁcult quest for a ‘‘complete’’ credit network. There are obvious restrictions on the
conditions determining the model environment which we plan to relax in the future. For instance, we would like to extend
the partner choice rule also to the market for consumption goods and to the labour market. This will imply a more
sophisticated design of households’ behaviour, which so far has been essentially passive. Another obvious extension is the
introduction of an interbank market, which will allow modelling the central bank and monetary policy.Acknowledgements
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